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Abstract
Steganography represents the art of unobtrusively con-
cealing a secrete message within some cover data. The
key scope of this work is about visual steganography tech-
niques that hide a full-sized color image / video within an-
other. A majority of existing works are devoted to the im-
age case, where both secret and cover data are images. We
empirically validate that image steganography model does
not naturally extend to the video case (i.e., hiding a video
into another video), mainly because it completely ignores
the temporal redundancy within consecutive video frames.
Our work proposes a novel solution to the problem of video
steganography. The technical contributions are two-fold:
first, the residual between two consecutive frames tends to
zero at most pixels. Hiding such highly-sparse data is sig-
nificantly easier than hiding the original frames. Motivated
by this fact, we propose to explicitly consider inter-frame
residuals rather than blindly applying image steganogra-
phy model on every video frame. Specifically, our model
contains two branches, one of which is specially designed
for hiding inter-frame difference into a cover video frame
and the other instead hides the original secret frame. A sim-
ple thresholding method determines which branch a secret
video frame shall choose. When revealing the concealed
secret video, two decoders are devised, revealing differ-
ence or frame respectively. Second, we develop the model
based on deep convolutional neural networks, which is the
first of its kind in the literature of video steganography. In
experiments, comprehensive evaluations are conducted to
compare our model with both classic least significant bit
(LSB) method and pure image steganography models. All
results strongly suggest that the proposed model enjoys ad-
vantages over previous methods. We also carefully investi-
gate key factors in the success of our deep video steganog-
raphy model.
The first two authors contribute equally. Yadong Mu is the correspond-
ing author of this work.
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Figure 1: The full scheme of steganography. See main text for
more explanation.
1. Introduction
The term steganography [7, 2] can date back to some
ancient technique developed in the 15th century. The goal
of steganography is to encode a secret message in some
transport medium (called cover in this paper) and covertly
communicate with a potential receiver who knows the de-
coding protocol. Essentially different from cryptography,
steganography aims to hide the presence of secret commu-
nications, allowing only the target recipient to know. State
differently, the covering medium can be publicly visible and
yet only the target receiver can perceive the presence and
decode the secret message. In practice, any steganography
model should conceal a secret message by concurrently op-
timizing two criteria: minimizing the change of the cover-
ing medium that leads to suspect from an adversary, and re-
ducing the residual between decoded secret message and its
ground truth. The research on steganography has practical
implications. For example, a number of nefarious applica-
tions of steganography techniques are known, such as hid-
ing commands that coordinate criminal activities through
images posted on social media websites. In the industry of
digital publishing, a common tactic to claiming authorship
without compromising the integrity of the digital content is
to embed digital watermarks. For some brief introduction
to steganography, one can refer to [16, 1, 12, 14].
Let us first explain the process of a typical steganography
system, which is shown in Fig. 1. In classic steganography,
the process involves three parties: Alice, Bob and Eve. Al-
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Figure 2: Exemplar results generated by an image steganography model. The role of each image is depicted in bold yellow text located
in the top-left of each image. To depict how container image deviates from the original cover image, we choose two local patches and
contrast them for these two images. Indeed, for the local patch delimited by the green box, from the container image one can observe the
ghost image of specific building in the secret image (in blue box). Better viewing after enlarging.
ice first conceals a secret message into a cover to obtain a
container message (or steganographic message), and then
sends the container message to Bob. Eve is an adversary
(the steganalyzer) to both Alice and Bob. Each message
that Eve observes is either cover or container. And Eve
makes a binary classification on each message. His goal is
to judge whether a message is steganographic or not. How-
ever, this steganalyzer is not requested to decode the hidden
secret message. In this scheme, we say Alice performs per-
fectly if she ensures: 1) Bob receives the container message
and successfully recover secret message at high accuracy
using a decoding protocol; and 2) Eve, who always attempts
to detect the presence of secret message, has exactly 50%
chance of correctly judging a container or cover message.
It is similar to the expectation in adversarial training [6, 4].
To accomplish both goals, the container message should not
deviate from the original cover too much, avoiding that ab-
normal pattern appears and is detected by Eve. Meanwhile,
it should also be in a good shape to be accurately deciphered
by the decoder model at Bob’s hand.
Hiding messages in an image has been a long-standing
research task of salient practical interest. One can gauge
the amount of concealed information through bits-per-pixel
(bpp), namely the amortized bits hidden at each pixel in the
cover image. A recent research trend is hiding a full-sized
color image into another same-sized image as exemplified
in [2]. We hereafter term the task image steganography.
This represents a highly challenging task since it pursues a
bpp level of 1 (i.e., each pixel in the cover hides a complete
RGB color). Fig. 2 illustrates a group of typical results cal-
culated from an image steganography model, faithfully fol-
lowing the scheme depicted in Fig. 1. The steganography
model can hardly accomplish both of Alice’s two goals in
the container. As shown in Fig. 2, artifacts can often be ob-
served in container, making it easily detected by an adver-
sary. In recent year, to improve the performance of an im-
age stegaongraphy model, researchers have explored deep
neural networks for learning both encoding model (cover +
secret→ container) and decoding model (container→ de-
coded secret) in above process. Successful applications are
found in [7, 2].
In this work, our major focus is video steganography.
The task aims to hide a full-sized video clip into another.
Considering the increasing popularity of video data across
the Internet, the research of video steganography, though
currently rarely found in the literature, represents a nascent
research topic of key practical implications. One may ar-
gue that image steganography model can be readily used to
solve the video steganography problem, by pairing frames
in cover / secret videos and feeding them into an image
model. We argue that this tactic is not optimal, because
it does not fully consider the temporal redundancy within
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Frame k Frame k+1 Residuals
Figure 3: Examples of video frames and inter-frame residuals. The column residuals represent the per-pixel difference between frame k
and k+1. The righmost column shows the distribution of RGB values (top) and residual values (bottom) for the first frame pair (top row).
consecutive video frames. Our work proposes a novel solu-
tion to video steganography. Briefly speaking, the technical
contributions are two-fold:
First, the residuals between two consecutive frames are
highly sparse. Critically, compared with hiding frame into
another frame, hiding such sparse residual in another video
frame defines a much easier task. Motivated by this fact, in-
stead of blindly applying image steganography model on all
frames, we propose to split frames into two sub-sets: refer-
ence frames and residual frames. Each residual frame is ob-
tained by differencing with specific reference frame. Corre-
spondingly, our model contains two branches at both the en-
coding and decoding stages, tackling either type of frames
respectively. We empirically validate this treatment can sig-
nificantly boost the container’s perceptual quality and in-
crease the possibility of fooling an adversary.
Secondly, our model is fully based on deep convolu-
tional neural networks, which is the first of its kind in video
steganography. Specifically, our deep video steganography
model consists of two H-networks for hiding references
or residuals, and two R-networks for revealing the secret
video. The full model is trained without any human annota-
tions and network parameters are optimized from scrach. In
experiments, comprehensive evaluations are conducted to
validate the powerful modeling of deep networks. We also
carefully design ablation investigation to find key factors in
our deep video steganography model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as following:
We first briefly review the related work in Section 2. Sec-
tion 3 details the proposed two-branch deep neural networks
for the video steganography task. All experimental evalua-
tions and in-depth analysis are found in Section 4. Finally,
Section 5 concludes this work and points out several future
research directions.
2. Related Work
Least significant bit (LSB) [15, 19] is a classic stegano-
graphic algorithm. It adopts a simple idea to embed a secret
image into another. In digital images, each pixel in an image
is comprised of three bytes (i.e., 8 binary bits), representing
the RGB chromatic values respectively. The LSB algorithm
replaces the least 4 significant bits of the cover image by
4 most significant bits of the secret image. For each byte,
the significant bits dominate the color values. This way, the
chromatic variation of the container image (altered cover)
is minimized. Decoding the concealed secret image can
be simply accomplished by reading the 4 least significant
bits and performing bit shift. Despite that its distortion is
not often visually observable, LSB is unfortunately highly
vulnerable to steganalysis [5] - statistical analysis can eas-
ily detect the pattern of altered pixels. Recent works have
been devoted to more sophisticated methods that preserve
the image statistics or design special distortion functions,
such as HUGO [17], WOW (wavelet obtained weights) [8],
S-UNIWARD [9], and ATS [13].
The most relevant works to ours are two deep learn-
ing based image steganography methods in [7, 2]. Much
earlier works [10, 18] adopts deep neural networks to ele-
vate accuracies, yet mostly in the decoding process, such
as determining which bits to extract from the container im-
ages. Both of [7, 2] build the whole system based on deep
networks, including encoding (hiding), decoding (reveal-
ing) and adversarial networks. The quantitative evaluations
strongly corroborate the superior modeling ability of deep
networks. However, to our best knowledge, there is no prior
work that explore deep networks for the hiding-video-in-
video setting. This paper provides clear evidence that di-
rect adaptation of image steganography model to video data
is not an optimal choice and we are thus motivated to de-
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Figure 4: The computational pipeline of our proposed video steganography model. See text for more details.
vise special video steganography model based on temporal
residual modeling.
3. The Proposed Model
Fig. 3 illustrates some motivating fact to our video
steganography model. As seen, the residual values between
consecutive video frames are dominated by near-zero val-
ues. Hiding such high-sparse data into a cover frame in-
tuitively requires less effort compared with a full-colored
secret frame, since hiding a zero value is trivial. This way,
the cover image tends to be less altered, which potentially
increases the chance of fooling an adversary. Using resid-
uals as the secrete message instead can ease Alice’s job (or
the encoding model) in Fig. 1 and meanwhile does not make
Bob’s task harder. However, to operate on residuals, there
are two challenges that we should concern: how to deter-
mine encoding the original video frame or its residual with
respect to the previous frame? And at the decoding stage,
how the decoder knows the received image conceals a full-
colored frame or a residual array?
To address above issues, we categorize all secret frames
to be either reference frame or residual frame. Correspond-
ingly, we propose to use two separate encoding / decoding
networks for tacking different type of frames. The architec-
ture of our proposed system is shown in Fig. 4. The system
is comprised of five computational steps:
Step-1: Reference/Residual Frame Labeling: We adopt
a simple thresholding approach for labeling a frame to be
reference or residual type. Specifically, the first frame
in a video is surely labeled as reference. The following
frames in the same video sequentially calculate their av-
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Table 1: Architecture of both Reference Hiding network and Residual Hiding network. There is a batch normalization
layer(BN) and a Leaky Rectified Linear Unit(LeakyReLU) after each convolution layer. And there is a BN and a Rectified
Linear Unit(ReLU) after each deconvolution layer except the last one. The output deconvolution layer is followed by a
Sigmoid function.
Index Type Kernel Stride Padding Input Out Concatenation
1 Conv2d. 4×4 2 1 6 64 N/A
2 Conv2d. 4×4 2 1 64 128 N/A
3 Conv2d. 4×4 2 1 128 256 N/A
4 Conv2d. 4×4 2 1 256 512 N/A
5 Conv2d. 4×4 2 1 512 512 N/A
6 Conv2d. 4×4 2 1 512 512 N/A
7 Conv2d. 4×4 2 1 512 512 N/A
8 deConv2d. 4×4 2 1 512 512 N/A
9 deConv2d. 4×4 2 1 1024 512 concat with layer #6
10 deConv2d. 4×4 2 1 1024 512 concat with layer #5
11 deConv2d. 4×4 2 1 1024 256 concat with layer #4
12 deConv2d. 4×4 2 1 512 128 concat with layer #3
13 deConv2d. 4×4 2 1 256 64 concat with layer #2
14 deConv2d. 4×4 2 1 128 3 concat with layer #1
Table 2: Architecture of both Reference Reveal network and Residual Reveal network. Each layer is a Inception block
with two kinds of kerneal size(3×3 and 5×5), and the output is the concatenation of both feature maps .There is a batch
normalization layer(BN) and a Rectified Linear Unit(ReLU) after each block layer except the last one.The output convolution
layer is followed by a Sigmoid function.
Index Type Kernel Stride Padding Input Out
1 Conv2d. 3×3 and 5×5 1 1 and 2 3 50×2
2 Conv2d. 3×3 and 5×5 1 1 and 2 100 50×2
3 Conv2d. 3×3 and 5×5 1 1 and 2 100 50×2
4 Conv2d. 3×3 and 5×5 1 1 and 2 100 50×2
5 Conv2d. 3×3 and 5×5 1 1 and 2 100 50×2
5 Conv2d. 1×1 1 0 100 3
eraged pixel-wise discrepancy (APD)1 with respect to the
first frame. Once the APD score of any frame exceeds some
pre-specified threshold, it will be set as a new reference and
used to calibrate all following frames. The procedure pro-
ceeds until all frames are labeled.
Step-2: Hiding Secret (encoding): This step does Alice’s
job in Fig. 1. The key differentiator of our method to others
is a divide-and-conquer scheme. Note that in Fig. 4 two hid-
ing networks are devised, referred to as Reference H-net or
Residual H-net respectively. Each frame is fed into the cor-
responding H-net by their label. It should be clarified that
these two H-nets do not share any parameter. They are indi-
vidually optimized for encoding specific type of frame only.
In this paper we term the new frame, which appears similar
to the cover yet conceals a secret somewhere, as container.
In practice, we choose the U-net model [3, 11] for both H-
1 For two RGB frames, we calculate pixel-wise absolute difference and
take the average for R-, G-, and B-channel respectively. The APD score is
defined as the average value across R, G, B channels.
nets. The network specifications are found in Table 1.
Step-3: Revealing Secret (decoding): It does Bob’s job in
Fig. 1. The input is merely the container, and the output
(we call it decoded secret) is another image which is de-
sired to be exactly the secret in the perfect case. Otherwise
the model is trained to minimize the discrepancy between
the secrete and its decoded version. Similar to H-nets, two
R-nets (Reference R-net or Residual R-net) are introduced
to reveal the frame or residual secret. However, unlike the
encoding stage, Bob strictly has no access to the cover or
secret, which implies that frame labels are missing. State
differently, the decoder is not aware of which R-net is the
optimal handler. We postpone this decision to the next step.
The container frame will be sent to both R-nets and obtained
two decoded secret images. The specification of R-nets is
found in Table 2. It is clarified that two R-nets do not share
parameters, despite the same network architecture.
Step-4: Frame-or-Residual Classification: Our proposed
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temporal residual modeling raises new challenges to the
classic scheme as depicted In Fig. 1 - Bob receives two
copies of decoded secret messages in Step-3, from Refer-
ence R-net or Residual R-net respectively. Clearly, only
one of the secrete message is true. Bob needs to pick out
the real message. In fact, we can exhaustively enumerate
all possible messages: the real reference and fake residual
(container with a true reference secret gets through Refer-
ence and Residual R-nets respectively), real residual or fake
reference (similar to above, but containers now carry resid-
uals), totalling four valid cases. Therefore, we formulate it
as a four-way classification problem. As seen in Fig. 4, a
Reference-or-Residual (RoR) Net is devised for judging an
input decoded message.
Similar to the R-nets, we let RoR Net have a mainframe
of five convolutional layers, each of which is paired with
BN layer and LeakyReLU. The key difference to R-nets is
that the network head is a linear fully-connected layer fol-
lowed by some softmax layer. Given an input image, the
softmax eventually returns a 4-d probabilistic vector that
categorizes the decoded information.
Step-5: Residual Frame Reconstruction: This step is op-
tional if Step 4 judges a message as real reference. How-
ever, for a residual frame, it is not visually understandable
per se. One need to add decoded residuals to the correct
reference frame for obtaining the concealed video frame.
Since we always process video frames in temporal order,
we can record the latest reference frame for reconstructing
residuals.
In our proposed system, H-nets / R-nets are jointly
trained before the RoR net. The overall loss function for
learning H-nets / R-nets is composed as individual loss de-
fined on each networks. Recall that H-nets output container
frame and R-nets return decoded reference or residuals.
Following a typical treatment in image segmentation, for H-
nets we define a loss on H-nets as summing all pixel-wise
difference between container / cover, and a loss on R-nets
for comparing decoded references / residuals and the origi-
nal copies. For learning the RoR net, we adopt the standard
cross-entropy loss to enforce label consistency.
4. Experiments
4.1. Dataset Description and Experimental Setting
There is no available benchmark used for video
steganography research. We therefore construct a new
benchmark as follows: TRECVID Multimedia event detec-
tion (MED)2 is a yearly competition about retrieving spe-
cific semantic events (such as “birthday party” or “park-
our”) from a huge pool of videos. The MED 2017 video
corpus consists of more than 0.3 Million videos with high-
2http://www-nlpir.nist.gov/projects/tv2017/Tasks/med/
‖ container - cover ‖ ‖ secret - decoded secret ‖
LSB model 6.64 8.64
Image model 4.46 5.04
Our model 3.80 5.84
Table 3: Averaged pixel-wise discrepancy (APD) scores for
different methods.
quality annotation. Since our task is essentially unsuper-
vised, we ignore the video semantic labels and randomly
sample 12,000 videos from the whole set. For each video,
a 2-second clip is randomly cropped and 24 frames are ex-
tracted using the tool of FFMPEG. We generate a data split
of training / validation / testing subsets, with 10,000, 1000,
and 1,000 video clips respectively.
On all 10,000 training videos, our simple threshold-
ing scheme generates 43,610 reference frames and 196,840
residuals. Videos are randomly drawn to form the (cover,
secret)-pair. The Reference H-net is trained using all refer-
ence frames, and Residual H-net utilizes the residuals. All
decoded messages collectively trains the four-way RoR net.
We tune the network parameter following common tactics,
such as decaying the learning rate after a fixed number of
iterations and using momentum to keep the solution sta-
ble. The best model on the validation set is kept as the final
model.
4.2. Empirical Evaluation and Analysis
Fig. 5 shows the steganography results on selected
videos. For each video, we show both the results of Ref-
erence H/R-nets and Residual H/R-nets. It is observed that
secret videos often have different color tone and textures
from the covering video, constructing a challenging task.
By investigating the residuals between container-cover and
secret-decoded secret pairs as in Fig. 5, one can observe that
the container frames still look visually natural. In Table 3,
we report the APD scores for the baseline least significant
bits (LSB). Since our Reference H/R-net is alike to the work
in [2], we separately report the APD scores of Reference
H/R-nets (image model in the table) and the full architecture
in Fig. 4. It is seen that our full model enjoys few distortions
for the container frames. This may attribute to the separate
processing of reference / residual frames. The decoded se-
cret message by the full model is slightly worse, potentially
caused by the residual reconstruction step. Both the image
model and our video-based model significantly outperforms
LSB. We also perform visual comparison with LSB and [2]3
in Fig. 6 and clear superiority goes to our model.
3The results are based on an unofficial re-implementation of
this image steganography model in https://github.com/harveyslash/Deep-
Steganography.
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Original Reconstructed   Residuals×5
cover      secret    cover     secret    cover   secret
Figure 5: Hiding results using our video model. Left pair of each set: original cover and secret frame. Center pair: cover frame embedded
with the secret frame (container), and the decoded secret frame. Right pair: Residual errors for container and secret (enhanced 5x). Secret
frames in odd and even rows are reference frames and residual frames respectively.
4.2.1 Where is the Secret Frame Encoded?
Following [2], we manually adjust the pixel values in con-
tainers and re-feed the modified container to R-net. By
checking the changes in decoded secret frame one may dis-
cover where the secret is hidden. As illustrated in Fig. 7,
we adjusted four 16×16 areas in a container. The left top
one sets all pixels to white color, and other three set either
of the RGB channels to 0, respectively. We have several
observations: first, the decoded secret changes accordingly,
with a large spatial field. It implies our encoding / decod-
ing models are non-local, unlike LSB. Secondly, we find
that image gradient matters in visual steganography. Zero-
ing a single color channel does not change much the image
gradient of the inner pixels, which explains that the inner re-
gion is still accurately reconstructed. However, the bound-
ary pixels, which suffers from severe gradient change, lose
the correct secret message.
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Figure 6: Comparison with LSB and Deep Steganography [2]. Left pair: The proposed method outperforms LSB in perceptual quality.
Right pair: Our model achieves better color fidelity and minor residual error than image model.
4.2.2 Investigation on Adversarial Learning
In steganography, a prominent goal is to fool the adversary,
Eve in Fig. 1. An interesting problem to us is: after collect-
ing how many labeled cover / container data, the adversary
will become accurate enough to detect the presence of se-
cret message? Without loss of generality, we assume the
adversary uses a 6-layer CNN for learning a binary classifi-
cation from labeled data. We investigate both LSB and our
video model, as shown in Fig. 8. Interestingly, both meth-
ods tend to have zero probability of fooling the adversary
after about 2,000 labeled data are leaked.
To increase the resistance to the adversary, we explore
an idea of adding an adversarial learning sub-model, sim-
ilar to [7]. Specifically, besides H/R-nets we incorporate
an adversarial discriminator (we assume it has a common
CNN architecture). It can receive frames from the cover and
container to make a judgment. If the discriminator cannot
distinguish a cover or container, it means that the container
generated by H-nets is able to fool this discriminator. We
adopt the classic GAN [6] loss for this discriminator. In one
of our experiments, we combine this GAN loss with H/R
losses, modulated via a hyper-parameter (set to 3e-4 em-
pirically), and re-train the video model. The APD scores
of the re-trained H/R-nets are 4.13 and 6.21, respectively,
which are slightly worse than the original video model in
Table 3. This implies that the new loss sacrifices APD in
H/R-nets for lower detectability by the adversary.
After re-training, we plot the curve of the new model
in Fig. 8 (denoted as “w/ GAN”). The apparent gap be-
tween the curves of original model (denoted as “w/o GAN”)
and new model indicates that the latter is enhanced for anti-
steganalysis. For example, for the original model, leaking
400 training pairs can enable the attacker to correctly dis-
tinguish 80% testing samples. While for the adversarially-
trained new model, to achieve this accuracy, more than 600
pairs are required. This experiment serves a strong evi-
dence that incorporating a GAN-style adversarial discrim-
inator can lead to a more steganalysis-secure message em-
bedding. It is also noted that, for LSB the adversary can
easily perform shift operations on covers and containers to
distinguish, making it less secure.
4.2.3 The Good and Bad Cover / Secret
It is an import problem to predict whether a pair of cover /
secret has the potential to generate low APD score. To this
end, we randomly select 100 videos as covers, and other 100
videos as secret videos to be hidden. They are exhaustively
paired and tested by our video model. We record the pair-
wise APD scores and plot them on the left matrix in Fig. 9.
Interesting, we find that some videos tend to be a “good”
cover or secret whatever the other party in the pair is, and
vice verse. It becomes clear by looking at the white or black
stripes in Fig. 9. For better understanding, we select the top
3 best or worse cover / secret and show them in the right
of Fig. 9. It is observed that “good” ones tend to have few
textures and lower saturation.
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Figure 7: Finding how the secret message is concealed. Column 1: cover image. Column 2: modified container by manually adjusting
four patches of original container image. Column 3: original decoded secret. Column 4: decoded secret image by re-feeding modified
container to R-net.
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Figure 8: Investigation on adversarial learning. The curves indicate how many leaked training samples are needed for an adversary to
distinguish a container from a cover, which reflects the anti-steganalysis ability of a model.
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Figure 9: Investigation of the “goodness” of covers or secret videos. Left: the matrix of inter-video APD scores (darker ones indicate
lower APD scores). Right: examples of “good” or “bad” covers or secret.
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Figure 10: Left: APD score between all 24 frames in a video with respect to the first. Right: the distribution of the lengths of video
segments obtained via thresholding.
4.2.4 Effect of Frame Locations
We adopt a thresholding scheme to split reference and resid-
ual frames. However, choosing a proper threshold is non-
trivial. In our experiment, we randomly selected 1000 short
videos (24 frames each one) and calculated the average of
every pixel’s residual from each frame to the first frame.
The curve is showed in Fig. 10. A large threshold will
generate more residuals, which tends to lead improved con-
tainer quality yet may degrade the decoded secret. If we set
a smaller threshold, there will be more reference frames,
making the video model quickly converge to the image
steganography. To search a good balance between H/R-nets,
we finally selected a threshold of 30.68. Let us term a ref-
erence frame and its following residuals as a video segment.
The right one in Fig. 10 plots the distribution of video seg-
ment lengths under the chosen threshold.
4.2.5 Reference-or-Residual (RoR) Network
As stated earlier, to categorize the decoded message we
train a four-class CNN Reference-or-Residual (RoR) clas-
sifier. In practice, we use the trained Reference H/R-nets
and Residual H/R-nets to collect training data, and use these
data to train the RoR network. On the testing set, an accu-
racy of 99.9625% was achieved, which is nearly perfect yet
the RoR network is still fooled by some hard samples. To at-
tack this issue, we propose an improved judgment method.
Because there are only two combinations of reference and
residual values, i.e. real reference and fake residual or fake
reference and real residual. Therefore, we add the probabil-
ity of real reference and probability of fake residual as P1,
the probability of fake reference and the probability of real
residual was added up as P2. If P1 is larger than P2, we
suppose that this container conceals reference information,
10
Figure 11: Failure cases.
otherwise it hides residuals. This simple scheme brings a
100% accuracy on the test set.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we present a novel deep neural network for
the task of video steganography. To fully utilize the sparse
property of inter-frame differences, we develop a tempo-
ral residual modeling technique, separately treating refer-
ence and residual frames during generating steganographic
videos. Comprehensive evaluations and studies show the
superiority of our method. The future work shall include
the exploration of more sophisticated deep models, such
as C3D [20], which may better handle failure cases as in
Fig. 11.
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